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Changing Faces of Change:





1 The  theme  of  “change”  is  one  of  the  most  common  slogans  bandied  about  in  U.S.
elections,  by both Republicans and Democrats,  and the 2016 presidential  race was no
different  in  that  regard.  The  difference  was  the  greater  degree  to  which  the  idea
resonated with voters, including new ones, making for an actual election of change rather
than serving as a mere rhetorical move. The term “election of change” is particularly
relevant here,  as  it  is  used to describe sharp shifts  in government caused by people
rebelling  against  the  current  establishment.  Historically  speaking,  such elections  are
marked by large alterations in voting patterns (e.g., 1932, 1980, 2008), and this was also
the case in 2016,  as seen by the dramatic mobilization of new voters in the primary
season. Involving much more than just electoral changes, however, this presidential race
also reflected a transformation in how people saw the candidates and the United States
overall. As such, the election of change in this case can also be defined as a collision of
worldviews due to a rise of the popular, including expressions of populism and popular
culture in competing metanarratives.
2 To understand how metanarratives functioned in the election, it is necessary to open the
scope  of  analysis  to  an  interdisciplinary  discussion,  integrating  aspects  of  history,
political philosophy (e.g.,  teleology),  media studies (especially social media),  discourse
analysis,  and  visual  semiotics,  in  order  to  encompass  such  diverse  data  as  electoral
statistics, emerging campaign strategies, and elements of U.S. popular culture. Each of
these angles tells an important part of the story—filling in different key pieces of the
puzzle,  so to speak—but the larger goal  of  this article is  to examine their respective
influences. For example, online media and memes had a strong impact on the campaigns
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and  on  voters’  perceptions,  starting  during  the  primaries  and  continuing  until  the
general in November, but the attention drawn to memes was also very important. The
same  could  be  said  of  the  meta-level  discussion  about  the  candidates’  competing
rhetorical  approaches,  the leanings of  the media (e.g.,  the disproportionate attention
given to Donald Trump), and the repeated use of the term “populism” to describe the
general  mood.  In  each  of  these  cases,  there  was  a  self-reflexive  element  and  even
antagonistic quality: memes played on other memes; media pundits located their version
of truth in relation to competing outlets, inviting analysts to question the value of news
itself (e.g., “fake news”); and the candidates not only deconstructed their opponents, but
were criticized (especially Trump) for the way in which they did it. The multiple agents—
including  the  “audience”  of  voters—involved  in  analyses  of  the  race  thus  sought  to
privilege  their  own  interpretations,  positioning  themselves  in  relation  to  the
construction of a story which included heroes, villains, and nothing less at stake than the
fate of the land. Like many other stories, the plot of this one was overwhelmingly built
around the idea of change, yet in this case it was not merely a tired trope or formulaic
slogan. Functioning in a dynamic way, change ended up not only being part of the story
but also included contestations over how the story should be written. Thus, “changing
faces of change” also hints at how actors framed themselves while simultaneously being
highly aware of  their  participatory significance:  perhaps more than ever before,  this
election largely took place in a mirror. It is in light of this self-reflexivity that one can
speak of metanarrative, which both critiqued the artificiality of the U.S. political process
(as constructed) and sought new forms of overarching meaning. 
3 The shift in the term “change” in the 2016 election can be seen as a perfect storm of
causes  and conditions,  both tangible  and ideological.  Indeed,  the  political  value  that
people accorded to popular narratives competed with real-world concerns. Among other
things, the soft causes behind the storm included the use of new forms of media to create
these popular narratives, the pervasive and participatory nature of online technology to
engage in and contest them, and the ability of the candidates to effectively speak to—or
define—the things  (rather  than issues  per  se)  that  resonated most  strongly with the
electorate.  The hard conditions included a dissatisfaction with government (only 27%
were satisfied),i a historical lack of trust in government (at an all-time low of 19%) ii and
mainstream media (all-time low of 40%),iii a significant decline in quality of life and net
worth among the middle and lower classes (down 60% for the latter over the previous
decade),iv and a growing cultural divide between urban and rural populations. As outliers
from the  establishment,  candidates  like  Donald  Trump and Bernie  Sanders  took  full
advantage of all these, offering a new narrative and painting themselves within it. But
they also benefitted from existing fractures in both parties, which had been building for
some time. Before moving on to a discussion of shifting representations and narratives,
therefore, it is first necessary to briefly contextualize how the time was ripe for change.
 
2. Fractures in the Façade and Outsiders Taking the
Stage
4 At the time of the last election in 2012, Eldon Eisenbach warned that the Democratic
Party’s  lack  of  ideological  force  in  the  preceding  decades  made it  vulnerable  to  the
seemingly cohesive agenda of the Republican party, movement conservatism, and the
activism of the Tea Party (formed in 2009).v At the outset of the 2016 election, this may
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have seemed like the greatest threat to the Democrats. Yet approximately twenty years
ago,  the philosopher Richard Rorty identified another danger when writing critically
about “the decline of the American Left”: “The nonsuburban electorate will decide that
the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for—someone
willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers,
overpaid  bond salesmen,  and postmodernist  professors  will  no  longer  be  calling  the
shots.”vi This quote was cited widely during the election as a prescient warning of Trump,
and it is poignant enough to be included here. But perhaps more important is what lies
behind  it,  namely,  Rorty’s  identification  of  another  vulnerability  of  the  Left—a  split
between what he identified as its progressive side and a “cultural” side.vii This election
saw that fault line crack wide open. In very general terms, Sanders sought to push the
Democratic party back to core economic issues by appealing to both existing and new
voters with his progressive platform, but the Democratic National Committee (DNC) chose
instead to rely on its perceived base, including “marginalized others” attracted over the
previous decades, while also engaging explicitly in culture wars. Last but not least among
the splits in the Democratic Party, it is also necessary to contrast progressivism and the
more recent tradition of neoliberalism championed by Hillary Clinton.
5 The Grand Old Party (GOP) would undergo its own ideological crisis when Trump won the
nomination. In his review of George Hawley’s Right-Wing Critics of American Conservatism,
Samuel Goldman explains, “Of all the illusions Trump has dispelled, however, none is
more significant than the illusion of the conservative movement. Rather than being the
dominant force in the Republican Party, conservatives, Trump revealed, are just another
pressure group. And not an especially large one. In state after state, voters indicated that
they did not care much about conservative orthodoxy on the economy, foreign policy, or
what  used to  be  called family  values.”viii Thus,  while  the  GOP’s  ideological  crisis  did
involve  competing  visions  of  different  types  of  Republican  candidates  (e.g.,  liberals/
moderates,  “somewhat  conservatives,”  very  conservative  evangelicals,  and  very
conservative seculars), it also reflected a decline in the importance of ideology itself, as
signaled by the voters’ willingness to instead accept Trump’s messaging on other aspects.
ix
6 The existence of fractures in the two parties was known prior to the election, but in the
beginning it was not clear that they were so acute. This became more evident with the
passing of many long months, during which the outsiders Trump and Sanders moved
inexorably  forward—in  the  Republican  pack  and  against  the  presumptive  Democrat
nominee. The length of the election season gave their movements time to grow, as well as
time for the public to gain familiarity with them. This happened in stages, as shown by a
set of photos of Bernie Sanders,  first at a local event in June 2015 at the house of a
Hollywood actress (Figure 1) and then in a stadium packed to overflowing with Sanders
supporters nine months later (Figure 2).
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7 Figure  1.  Sanders  campaigning  in  the yard  of  actress  Mimi  Kennedy  in  Van  Nuys,
California (June 20, 2015). Photo credit (still frame from video): Charles Fredricks and
Lionel Heredia. 
8 Figure 2. Sanders at a rally with 10,000 people in Madison, Wisconsin (March 26, 2016).
Bernie Sanders campaign photo.x
9 At the beginning of the presidential race, Donald Trump was similarly perceived as a non-
contender.  An  NBC/Wall  Street  Journal survey  conducted  in  March  2015  (before  he
announced his candidacy) found that only 23% of Republicans could see voting for him.
Four months later, that number had doubled. By January 2016, it had risen to 65%.xi A
scenario  that  many  could  never  have  imagined  was  becoming  a  reality.  For  both
candidates, a shift in perception of what was possible led to further growth. This feedback
loop made for an explosive situation.
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3. Strategic Shifts in Representation 
10 Both candidates would not have gotten as far as  they did without going outside the
traditional  bases  of  their  parties.xii In  their  quest  for  new  voters,  they  employed
conventional techniques but also exploited new ones. Campaigns typically use a range of
techniques to find and register fresh faces, including door-to-door canvassing, signage,
phone banks, events, rallies, and mass media, each of which offer different degrees of
conversion  success.  But  the  how-to  aspects  of  targeting,  covered  elsewhere  in  great
detail,xiii are not core to the current discussion here. More applicable to the discussion of
change is the organic process by means of which the grassroots movements formed and
how in turn they spread like wildfire. 
11 First and foremost in this regard is new media, which has been recognized as a powerful
means of fueling populism and driving increased voter engagement since the dawn of the
Internet.xiv Improvements  in  technology  and  increased  networking  of  virtual
communities over the succeeding two decades have only accentuated its strength. Social
media serves as  a  mode of  communication between candidates and their  supporters,
approximating a direct social bond instead of messaging filtered through mainstream
media. This was very important for the Sanders campaign, considering that the television
networks mentioned Trump twice as much as Clinton and nearly ten times more than the
Vermont senator.xv In  addition,  sharing functions can provide dramatically  increased
numbers of impressions for a single post or photo or tweet. Trump and Sanders used
social media to great effect, not only in terms of activity but engagement. In a snapshot
taken late in the primary season (April 4 – May 4, 2016), Crowdbabble showed how much
they were succeeding on social media compared to Clinton: on Facebook, Trump led with
a  218%  engagement  rate,  nearly  twice  that  of  Clinton;  on  Twitter,  Sanders  was
particularly strong, with nearly five times more retweets than Clinton and twice as many
as Trump; and on Instagram, particularly popular among Millennials, Sanders and Trump
were virtually tied with nearly a 50% margin over Clinton.xvi 
12 Online media also disrupts other traditional models of political engagement. For example,
in  its  fundraising  efforts  the  Sanders  campaign  was  able  to  leverage  a  long-tail
movement. This term, coined in 2004 by Chris Anderson of WIRED magazine, describes the
displacement  of  “mainstream”  content,  determined  by  marketers  and  served  to
consumers, by niche content that people really want. Companies that use this strategy
are organized to listen to consumers, but they also rely on user-driven innovation and
community-building with large numbers of people. The idea was first used in a political
sense in the 2008 presidential election,xvii primarily to describe the ability of a grassroots
campaign to raise large amounts of money via the Internet. This happened again in 2016
with an even greater degree of success. With nearly seven million individual campaign
contributions,  Sanders—or,  more accurately,  his  supporters—demolished the previous
record of 2.2 million set by President Obama four years before.xviii Trump set a new record
for Republicans with 2.6 million contributions.xix
13 Furthermore,  as suggested by the sociologist  Nick Couldry,  social  media activism can
support  negative  reactions  against  the  establishment:  drawing  attention,  amplifying
rhetoric and applying strong pressure on institutional actors.xx This was an undeniably
important factor in the 2016 election. However, on the downside (or what Couldry calls
the demand-side), increased connectivity comes at a cost: how much time people have to
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analyze all of the data in their feeds and the common tendency of people to believe that
they  are  an  expert.  These  two  phenomena  fed  the  propagation  of  “fake  news”  and
extreme ideological  positions,  informed by alt-right  networks  like  Breitbart  News and
InfoWars (streamed via YouTube) and, alternatively, by fly-by-night “liberal” websites.
More often than not, voters were taken in by these: as many as 84% of Republicans and
71% of Democrats were likely to view fake news stories as accurate.xxi In many cases, the
news bordered on conspiracy  theory or  went  beyond the  pale.  The demonization of
Clinton ranged from charges of involvement in a child-sex ring (according to fake news
sites,  the  candidate  and  the  chairman  of  her  campaign,  John  Podesta,  engaged  in
pedophilia  and Satanic rituals;  on Reddit  boards and Twitter,  this  rumor was spread
under the handle of #pizzagate) to stories of assassinations carried out by her and her
husband. These drove the Trump-supporter Alex Jones to rant, “When I think about all
the children Hillary Clinton has personally murdered and chopped up and raped, I have
zero fear standing up against her. […] I just can’t hold back the truth anymore.”xxii 
14 As sensationalist as these tales were, they were incredibly viral. And despite their odd
inversion of reality, these politically motivated negotiations of “truth” carried weight
among  certain  segments  of  the  population—particularly  a  younger  demographic—
bringing new voters into the ranks.  In the same month as the RNC,  the audience of
InfoWars swelled to 40 million unique visitors a monthxxiii and Breitbart News rose to claim
9% of  the entire  general  news audience,  with 18 million visitors.xxiv The demand for
change among Trump supporters can thus be seen in how they turned the dial away from
mainstream media, which they distrusted. Truth was made relative, employed when and
where it fit, and in echo chambers led to little cognitive dissonance. Those who were
crucifying  Clinton  for  being  the  great  #liar  did  not  seem  to  care  that  Trump  was
constantly changing stories and backtracking. In his case, it only proved the rule to the
old adage, “all press is good press,” as he himself boasted in response to his wife Melania’s
plagiarism of Michelle Obama’s speech during the Republican National Convention.xxv 
15 Often crossing the line between truth and “post-truth”—defined by the Oxford English
Dictionary as “relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (and
added as its word of 2016, based on a 2000% increase on its usage from the previous year
xxvi)—Trump was a storyteller whose tale featured him as the main star. It was not hard
for his  audience to engage in suspension of  disbelief.  After  all,  he was the host  and
producer of a reality show which the audience knew to only be quasi-real.xxvii Set in a
political context, this dynamic evoked the famous warning of Hannah Arendt, “The ideal
subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the dedicated communist, but
people  for  whom the  distinction between fact  and fiction,  true  and false,  no  longer
exists.”xxviii 
16 Hollywood  has a  peculiar  phrase,  “to  jump  the  shark.”  It  is  used  to  describe  when
completely unbelievable elements are included in a story in order to spice things up for a
tired audience. Based on the infamous episode of Happy Days when Fonzie literally jumped
a shark on water-skis,xxix this device is commonly taken as an indication that a movie or
TV series has hit rock-bottom. During the election season, political commentators used
the term in relation to Trump’s increasingly controversial remarks, debating how low he
could go before his campaign was irrevocably sabotaged. But the inversion of reality and
fiction meant  that  there  was  no limit.  Trump was  larger  than life,  being more  of  a
caricature than an ordinary person operative in the same world as his supporters.
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17 In line with their ideal of a populist champion fighting for them against the system,
supporters of both Trump and Sanders generated visual representations of heroes and
actively  disseminated  political  cartoons  with  that  theme.  Images  of  Trump  typically
presented figures characterized by extreme strength and invulnerability, even featuring
rage and martial motifs (see Figures 3 and 4 with Trump Photoshopped onto Marvel’s
Incredible Hulk and as a positively caricatured superhero). 
18 Figure 3. Meme of Trump as the Incredible Hulk from The Avengers.xxx
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19 Figure 4. “Triumphant Trump” by Ben Garrison (GrrrGraphics). Permission granted by
the artist.xxxi
20 The  “warrior”  motif  fit  Trump  well,  reflecting  his  ability  to  resist  attacks.  Set  in  a
narrative context, it also provided him with justifications for his more boorish behavior,
whether it  was aggressive (e.g.,  inciting supporters to violence at  rallies)  or sexually
inappropriate (e.g., his lewd remarks about groping women or his sexualizing comments
about his daughter, Ivanka). For example, although it may be crudely put, fans of Conan
the Barbarian might not begrudge their hero a toss in the hay with a wench on his way
back from battle. They allow it because the story is not real, because it accords with a
certain  archetype,  and  perhaps  even  because  it  expresses  an  impulse  that  they
themselves have sublimated. Thus, following in the footsteps of Arnold Schwarzenegger,
who  successfully  ran  as  governor  of  California  in  2003,  Trump  directly  combined
populism and popular culture.
21 Contrasted against this narrative of “might makes right” was the “right makes right” of
Bernie  Sanders,  whose  supporters  framed  him  as  the  wise,  old  man  archetype  or
superhero (see Figures 5 and 6 with Sanders as DC’s Superman and assorted characters
from  fantasy  stories).  Superman,  of  course,  defends  the  “little  guy”  who  has  been
increasingly marginalized and disempowered. Sages are commonly cast as outsiders, even
loners, facing long odds in a fight for the common good; another one of their qualities is
knowledge of the truth. This image went a long way with Millennials, who tend to have
more trust issues than their older peers: only 19% say that most people can be trusted,
compared to 31% of Gen-Xers and 40% of Baby Boomers.xxxii It could be argued, of course,
that such portrayals of Sanders were done within the context of fantasy—no one expected
that Gandalf or Superman was actually going to come and save them. And yet popular
cultural symbols are embedded with powerful signifiers that deeply resonate with people,
affecting how they approach the world, even politically. One need only look at the history
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of propaganda, especially that of World War II, which employed both film and superhero
comics to great effect.xxxiii 
22 Figure 5. Meme of Sanders as Superman.xxxiv
23 Figure 6. Sanders compared to Albus Dumbledore (Harry Potter), Gandalf (Lord of the Rings),
and Obi-Wan Kenobi (Star Wars).xxxv
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24 Although the visual examples given here reflect only a limited selection of ways in which
the candidates were perceived, they are valuable insofar that they also illustrate how the
voters perceived themselves. So-called “Berners” tended to frame their struggle in moral
terms, and through identification with their hero they were able to see themselves on the
side of good. In light of such a highly polarized narrative, it is no wonder that many found
it difficult to embrace Clinton or believed that Sanders lost his credibility when he went
over to the “dark side” (by supporting her nomination at the DNC). They were part of the
war of truth that had been waged in the election, and they felt personally affected by the
perceived injustices dealt to their hero: voter suppression (e.g., the elimination of polling
locations),  registration  purges  (e.g.,  120,000  in  Brooklyn),  fraud  (e.g.,  indications  of
variances between vote totals and exit polls), and the machinations of the DNC (in specific
states like Nevada and nationwide).xxxvi It is ironic that Sanders’ supporters were treated
as  conspiracy theorists  for  raising these  issues,  given the post-truth environment  in
which Trump ultimately prevailed.
25 For their part, the Trump army followed the battle cry of their fearless leader, not just
verbally but physically. If the attacks on Trump from the media and the Left only seemed
to make him stronger in their eyes, it was in equal part due to his ability to portray
himself as persecuted and the tendency of his supporters to see themselves as persecuted
and stigmatized as well. Most important in their eyes was that he fought back, a culture
warrior who would reclaim the territory lost in the name of political correctness. In this
sense, Trump did not claim the moral high ground—certainly not in the way that the
Moral Majority had (e.g., Reagan and Jerry Falwell casting liberals as hedonistic)—and in
fact he renounced it. Changing the currency of how a candidate is valued, he upset the
entire  cultural  economy,  in  the  process  opening  the  door  for  free  expression,
consequences be damned. Furthermore, because Trump did not feel the need to contain
himself, his followers dared to push the limits, expressing their anger not just at rallies
but in wider society. It was a profound shift that many of his followers—and perhaps even
he himself—could not have previously anticipated or articulated, and yet, once it came, it
aligned with their demand for change.
26 As  catalysts  of  transformation,  the  elements  discussed  above  can  be  seen  driving  a
collision between politics  and popular culture.  For the sake of  visualization,  one can
illustrate their relationship as a set of spheres (see Figure 7), each with their own specific
contexts but also an area of crossover, encompassing dynamics affecting both political
agents and their broader audience. In the context of 2016 as an election of change, this
crossover area was especially in play, both implicitly and explicitly. Politicians struggled
with traditional forms of representation and/or leveraged new models, based on shared
cultural  assumptions.  Identity  formation not  only pertained to voters (i.e.,  how they
would align themselves on Election Day), but also the candidates, as their constructed
personae were impacted by reinterpretations (e.g., social media memes, such as those
shown above) infused with references to popular culture. Mirrored perceptions of the
election as show and elements of show business imported into the election made it a
spectacle, leading to different types of expectations on the part of the voting “audience.”
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27 Figure 7. Crossover of political and popular cultural spheres.
28 Yet  this  this  election  also  revealed  how  it  is  becoming  more  and  more  difficult  to
delineate  where  politics  leaves  off  and  popular  culture  picks  up,  or  vice  versa.  The
intersection between the two spheres appears as increasingly uncharted waters, in which
pundits  and political  commentators—journalists  and scholars  alike—are trying to  get
their bearings.  All  too soon,  such neat categorizations break down.  For example,  the
category “popular culture” informs only one aspect of crossover of the popular with the
political domain. To accurately reflect the fuller set of forces at work in the election, it is
also necessary to add media in its various forms (e.g., mainstream media, alt-right media,
social  media),  where  the  aforementioned  competing  elements  of  spectacle,  identity
formation, memes and so forth played out as well. This relationship can be represented
with  media  as  a  type  of  filter—indeed,  mediating—between  voters  and  the  political
sphere. Traditionally, the influence has been top-down (see Figure 8).
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29 Figure 8. Traditional model of mediation between the political and public domains.
30 During the course of the 2016 election, however, there emerged game-changing factors
that leveled the playing field and dramatically altered the conventions that politicians
were used to: the increased importance of alternative forms of media, decreased trust in
mainstream media, and the ubiquitous and participatory nature of social media. These
manifested in different ways.  For example,  Bernie Sanders’  campaign was grassroots-
based, and the bottom-up power of social media was especially apparent; the effect of
mainstream media was minimal (see Figure 9). Donald Trump also used “fan-based” social
media to great advantage, and he capitalized on the traditional top-down attention of the
mainstream media through sensationalism. In his case, the alt-right not only mediated
his message, but informed it (see Figure 10).
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Figure 9. Media and the Sanders campaign.
 
31 Figure 10. Media and the Trump campaign.
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32 Thus,  the 2016 election was different from previous ones in the way voters received
information,  how they perceived and reshaped it,  and the extent to which especially
engaged (and creative) participants pushed it back into the public arena. The shifting
importance  of  the  various  types  of  media  also  signaled  a  movement  of  vectors  of
influence,  with  significant  impacts  on  the  voters,  the  candidates,  and  the  media
organizations  themselves.  In  each  of  these,  there  arose  questions  of  truth  and
authenticity (e.g., the phenomenon of “fake news”), further complicating the messages of
the campaigns and creating wider divides between the competing camps of voters.
 
4. Changing Identities
33 When voters demand change,  it  is usually predicated on a sense of self.  People want
things to be different for themselves, for their family and community, or for the country.
Identity, both individual and collective, is an important aspect of desiring something new
and aversion to the way things are.  In all  previous elections,  people have organized
themselves on this basis. For example, 2012 saw the Occupy movement and Tea Party
movement as new expressions within the larger political parties, which themselves have
historically provided a context for identification, dating back to the birth of the nation. In
2016, however, the disruptive entry of outliers into the race provoked an identity crisis,
demanding the electorate to define itself in new ways. To provide some context, pundits
called  Trump  a  populist  and  Sanders  a  progressive  (or  a  populist  as  well),xxxvii but
conservatives and liberals alike faced a challenge in aligning these terms—and candidates
—with the parties they knew. 
34 This identity crisis was not entirely new. In Our Divided Political Heart: The Battle for the
American Idea in an Age of Discontent, the political commentator E.J. Dionne points to the
historical tension between individualism versus the community, but also problematizes
populism and progressivism as they have been coopted by Republicans and Democrats, to
expose  the  underlying  divide  of  the  country  today.xxxviii He  concludes  that  the
fundamental problem is one of identity, as U.S. citizens have lost sight of the original
vision of the Founding Fathers.  As he succinctly states,  “We don’t know who we are,
because  we  don’t  know who we’ve  been.”xxxix Needless  to  say,  this  problem was  not
resolved before the 2016 election, leaving an open stage for Trump and Sanders to offer
their definitions—not surprisingly, in terms of individualism and collectivism, populism
and progressivism.
35 For many, the identity crisis was the moment they had been waiting for. Some considered
themselves  independent,  whether  they  were  registered  that  way  or  not,  perhaps
belonging to a certain party but not necessarily adhering to its dogma. Others felt very
disconnected from the current administration, but traditional types of candidates as well.
One could say this of previous elections, of course. But the redefinition of the political
landscape in 2016 was very different from what Obama had offered four years before, or
eight years before, or what other politicians had offered before that. In this election,
there was a pronounced space for existing voters to define themselves anew. It was even
more true for new voters—from Millennials  to “angry white guys,”  to quote Senator
Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina)xl—finding their voice.
36 In  a  way,  this  space  offered a  reverse  type of  identity  politics.  In  a  departure  from
Obama’s popularity among blacks in 2008 and Clinton’s appeals to women both then and
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in 2016, Trump flipped the dialogue by othering, listing those who had no place in the
United States and disparaging some who already were. His definition of the nation was
based on what the U.S. was not, leaving a void that his followers—who knew that they
were American—were eager to fill. By employing reverse identity politics, no one could
say  that  he  was  explicitly  targeting  whites.  And  yet  that  was  its  effect.  Eliciting
controversy but not to the point where it led to civil unrest, he got the votes he needed. 
37 While Sanders completely differed in tone from Trump, using inclusive language that
invited diversity, he did not “play” identity politics. Even that concept, which demands
problematization as potentially dismissive of  minorities  and disenfranchising of  their
agency, was not visible in his rhetoric or campaign ads. Instead, he presented a vision of
the United States as offering a different kind of space for people to enter, where people
had room to define themselves.
38 As became very clear, change means different things to different people. For Trump, “the
change you’ve been waiting for your entire life”xli meant replacing the establishment,
which could only be done by someone like him: “Change has to come from outside our
very broken system.”xlii Sanders also blamed the administration, but noted that change
comes from the bottom up, not the top down: “What the system always tries to make us
feel  is  that real  change is impossible.”xliii The incongruity between these perspectives
signals  a  deeper  difference  between the  candidates—namely,  the  way  in  which  they
approached their supporters. 
39 In his language, Trump often painted his followers as passive (e.g., “waiting”), while he
was  the  active  agent  of  change.  At  the  Republican  convention,  for  example,  he
proclaimed, “I am your voice. Believe me. Believe me.” And at his rallies, people called out
what they wanted him to do to Clinton and in Washington: “Lock her up!”, “Drain the
swamp!” Ironically, Trump’s supporters sought a forceful leader in their revolt against
those  in  office.  Moreover,  in  line  with  theories  on  authoritarianism,xliv they  also
appreciated his strongman position against outsiders (e.g.,  immigrants, countries with
trade agreements perceived as unfair),  whose vision of change conflicted with theirs.
Trump would be their protector.
40 In contrast, Sanders spoke to an empowerment of the people and their engagement with a
larger movement of change. This sentiment was summed up succinctly in a Tweet from
January 2016: “I’ve said it since day one: this campaign is not about me, it’s about you.
#NotMeUs.”xlv After losing the nomination,  Sanders directed his supporters’  attention
beyond the presidential election and toward advancing the progressive agenda through
smaller races around the country and a transformation of the Democratic Party. He did
not give them orders whom to vote for. To be sure, he urged people to vote for Clinton to
prevent  a  Trump presidency,  but  ultimately he admitted,  “People have to vote their
conscience.”xlvi This ceding of authority is what gave him power.
41 Although the resistance movements of Trump and Sanders differed greatly, they shared a
common  strategy  of  destabilizing  existing  political  narratives  by  reinforcing  public
perceptions that these were tired and ineffective, but also duplicitous and serving other
interests  than those of  the people.  In this  polarized environment,  political  authority
became a liability. The fact that Trump had never been elected to public office was a
taken as a badge of his qualification to serve.  Indeed,  his supporters cited that their
primary reason for  voting  for  him was  because  he  was  an outsider.xlvii For  his  part,
Sanders offered more than two decades of challenging Congress as an independent, not to
mention being a self-described “Democratic Socialist.” One could argue that these two
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candidates’ popular appeal was based on a short-term disruption of established actors
rather than an extensively planned agenda. But being fuzzy on the details did not harm
them. On the contrary, it played to the general atmosphere surrounding the election.
 
5. Changing Narratives
42 Although the conditions were right for a protest vote, there was no central cause that
people self-organized and rallied around. In this instance, the catalyst for mobilization
was a more abstract vision for change. How did Sanders and Trump prove especially
capable  in  this  regard  where  other  candidates,  both historically  and  in  the  current
election, did not? One way of understanding their success is in terms of the story they
told. More specifically, this can be seen through the philosophical theory of teleology,
applied in a political context, to describe the advancement of the nation along a historical
trajectory toward an ultimate goal. The way in which Trump and Sanders positioned the
current state of the country provided their supporters with a sense of purpose, which in
turn converted into votes. 
43 Richard  W.  Leeman’s  analysis  of  the  2008  presidential  election  offers  a  valuable
introduction to this discourse of change. By examining campaign speeches, Leeman was
able to show how Obama framed the United States as a telos, a transcendent goal yet to be
achieved.xlviii This  rhetorical  move—marked  by  the  use  of  words  like  “quest”  and
“journey,” which even featured prominently in Obama’s presidential  announcement—
effectively led voters to feel as if they were part of a story, even a movement, rather than
a mere political campaign.xlix Both Trump and Sanders employed a teleological message as
well, albeit in different ways, to effect a similar experience for voters.
44 With  his  slogan  “Make  America  Great  Again”  (lifted  from  Ronald  Reagan’s  1980
campaign), Trump effectively harnessed two powerful yet contradictory beliefs: declinism
(i.e., the country is falling apart) and exceptionalism (i.e., the U.S.A. is special, which for
the Trump campaign translated as a call to keep out those people who would degrade
that).  For  decades,  exceptionalism  had  been  the  standard  storyline  for  presidential
candidates,  and the well-established tenet served as the guiding principle of Obama’s
campaign message: “‘We Americans move forward as one people,’ and the question we
continually face is ‘how we will write the next chapter in the great American story.’”l The
idea of moving along a preexisting essence of greatness was what made teleology possible
and informed its transcendent aspect; being part of that history defined what it meant to
be “American” and provided a sense of purpose. For Trump, however, the exceptionalism
of the United States was debatable. Shortly before announcing his candidacy, he declared
that he did not “like the term” or find it accurate. Instead, he explained, “I’d like to make
us exceptional.”li 
45 This seemingly simple move was very significant for Trump’s overall narrative of change.
By not denying exceptionalism altogether but pushing it into the future, Trump kept the
proven theme of a telos but moved it further out on the horizon. In the process, this
opened the space for a redefinition of where the United States is now, which Trump
clearly articulated in the same speech: “we’re dying.” Thus, before even entering the
race,  he  had already introduced the negative,  declinist  message that  would come to
define his campaign. It marked a profound ideological shift, not just from Obama but also
the Republican establishment, as “American exceptionalism” had been an explicit and
notable element of the 2012 GOP platform.lii
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46 More specifically in terms of the discourse of change, declinism not only expanded the
teleological frame, but introduced a starting point for the journey, offering a greater
narrative arc in which voters were embedded. The addition made for a more epic quest
while simultaneously framing the present in terms of dysfunctionality, which provided
the hero—Trump, of  course—with a compelling set of  obstacles to overcome.  All  this
made for a more compelling story. Nor did the audience have a hard time identifying with
it. Trump’s portrayal of the nation as dying resonated deeply and emotionally with large
segments of the electorate, in direct alignment with their experience. For example, in a
Pew Research survey conducted in March 2016, a majority of Trump supporters (75%)
asserted that  life  is  worse than fifty  years  ago;  by comparison,  only 34% of  Sanders
supporters and 22% of Clinton supporters felt  the same way.liii The call  to action for
Trump’s audience was not subtle:  make America great again or continue to suffer.  It
would not be easy—their champion’s bellicose tone left no doubt that they would have to
fight—but this only reinforced their sense of teleological purpose in the restoration of the
country.  It  could be said that if  Obama forged a movement for change by an almost
religious message of hope, Trump’s narrative of decline, leveraging a combination of pain
and nostalgia, was used to build an army. 
47 Sanders also challenged U.S. exceptionalism, but in different ways. Instead of playing to
the past like Trump, Sanders’ campaign slogan looked forward: “A Future to Believe In.”
This  implied  a  need  for  change,  but  also  the  possibility  that  the  teleology may not
uniquely involve the United States. For example, when George Stephanopoulos criticized
him in  an  interview  for  wanting  the  U.S.  to  “look  more  like  Scandinavia,”  Sanders
answered that there is nothing wrong with that—and then followed up with reasons why
the Nordic countries are better (e.g., less inequality of wealth, a stronger middle class).liv
Instead  of  harming  him,  this  position  played  well  to  a  younger  audience,  especially
Millennials, only a third of whom (32%) agree that the U.S. is the greatest country in the
world.lv If  one might wonder why they believe that,  considering that probably only a
fraction of them have been outside of the country, the abstract nature of the change they
imagined can again be highlighted.
48 Whether Sanders adhered to declinism is a matter of debate. His rhetoric did not use it to
frame change in the same way as Trump, but rather as the term was first used by Samuel
Huntington  to  pejoratively  describe  those  on  the  ideological  left  who  eschewed
exceptionalism.lvi Furthermore, by lambasting the direction that nation has moved in—
primarily  meaning  the  government  but  also  its  relationship  with  Wall  Street  and
multinational corporations—Sanders opened a narrative that his supporters adopted and
made their own. Specifically, this involved a personification of decline in the political
arena in the form of Hillary Clinton, whom they vilified far more than Sanders ever did.
She provided the face for what they wanted to change. Within a wider context, of course,
the  more  that  Sanders  supporters  bought  into  this  negative  image,  which  not  only
reflected Trump’s negative rhetoric but was fueled by ultraconservative super PACs (e.g.,
Karl Rove was behind the ubiquitous hashtag #neverhillary),lvii the more it was
detrimental to the Democratic Party’s attempts to get them on board for the general. The
narrative of the party’s decline was thus a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
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6. Conclusion
49 The change that  was  wrought  not  only  bears  on the  historical  moment  of  the  2016
election as past, but the political landscape of the United States going forward. For both
parties,  it  was  a  watershed moment,  and after  the  shifts  that  took place,  it  may be
impossible for them to recover their previous identities. The future of the Republican
Party depends largely on Trump—how closely he works with the existing Congress or
burns bridges, the way in which he goes about “draining the swamp,” to what extent he
keeps his campaign promises to those who voted for him (and are not going away soon),
and many other things besides. Furthermore, just because he ran on a platform of change
does not mean he will necessarily deliver it. As Rorty observed, “The Right thinks that our
country already has a moral identity,  and hopes to keep that identity intact.  It  fears
economic and political change, and therefore easily becomes the pawn of the rich and
powerful—the people whose selfish interests are served by forestalling such change.”lviii
As a billionaire, Trump may very well prove to fall into the latter category. 
50 On the Democrat side, although Sanders did not make it past the primaries, the level of
groundswell support that he was able to build has considerable ramifications for future
elections. In combination with the sustained growth of independent voters, one can see it
as the potential beginning of a long-tail movement, not in the sense of fundraising but as
a model of new voters expressing their voice and asserting their will outside a political
party telling them what to expect. 
51 Finally, while the theme of demanding change is nothing new, the ways in which it is
expressed  have  changed.  Accordingly,  Trump’s  largely  unexpected  victory  not  only
points  to  the  significance  of  the  2016  election,  but  wider  shifts  in  agency  and
representation  that  promise  to  inform  elections  to  come.  Many  of  the  voters  who
experienced the power of a grassroots movement for the first time will likely be looking
forward to making their voices heard again, if not more forcefully. Cracks have plainly
appeared within both the parties, while the hold of the traditional media has loosened,
with participatory engagement in pop politics only expected to only grow. To be sure, the
competing stories in 2020 will be different from those of 2016, but particularly important
to watch will be the metanarratives employed in creating them.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  explores  the significance of  the theme of  “change” in the 2016 U.S.  Presidential
Election, going beyond its rhetorical use by the candidates or as a way of defining a historic
electoral shift (making an “election of change”) to examine how change played a critical role in
the political landscape itself. One can locate voters’ desire for change in many existing conditions
leading up to the race,  but also ideologically and as a force in its own right.  Framing of the
election  as  a  story  reveals  that  the  various  actors  were  increasingly  aware  of  their  shifting
identities, representations, and agency; thus, change was not just a plot of the story, frequently
expressed  in  terms  of  populism  and  popular  culture,  but  a  fundamental  dynamic  behind
competing metanarratives and contestations of how the story should be told.
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